Timor link, no. 47, June 1999 by unknown
link 
News, analysis and action in support of justice for East Timor No.47 June 1999 
Deliverance? 
The governments of Indonesia and Portugal have agreed the arrangements for a ballot on East 
Timor's future (see page 2). This issue of 
Timor Link examines the framework 
provided by the accords, which is 
expected to govern events in East Timor 
between now and the ballot on 8 August. 
We reprint the texts of the accords, 
together with analysis and proposals for 
action by the international solidarity 
community. It is essential that East Timor 
receives the international spotlight that 
should ensure a free and fair vote. 
The British Coalition for East Timor, of 
which CllR is a member, recommends that 
solidarity groups, Justice & Peace groups, 
and trades unions pursue the following 
through parliamentary channels: 
• Demand substantial reduction in 
numbers of Indonesian army personnel 
in East Timor and the immediate 
disarmament of armed militias. 
• Maintain international as well as 
Also in this issue 
As preparations for the autonomy ballot 
begin, violence in East Timor is on the 
rise. Militia groups backed by the 
Indonesian armed forces have begun a 
campaign to intimidate supporters of 
independence, with a view to 
subverting or aborting the vote. We 
print a letter from East Timor which 
conveys the impact of this terror 
campaign. Ian Linden, executive director 
of CllR, argues that an armed UN 
presence is essential to stop the militias, 
and puts the case for the churches to 
organise their own monitoring 
programme for East Timor's transition, 
on the model of the Ecumenical 
Monitoring Programme in South Africa. 
Timorese demonstrators confront the Indonesian army at Dili airport - the same army is supposed 
to ensure a free and fair vote in the upcoming ballot. 
domestic pressure on the Indonesian 
army to stay neutral, and to bring all 
intimidation to an end . 
• Release all political prisoners, including 
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Xanana Gusmao, who should be 
allowed to return to East Timor in safety 
with fellow members of the East 
Timorese resistance to campaign freely. 
• Insist that the Commission on Peace 
and Stability set up in Dili to oversee the 
process is chaired by the United 
Nations. 
• Send as many independent monitors, 
including VIPs, as possible to East Timor, 
from now until 8 August, with some 
staying on afterwards. 
• Monitor the implementation of the 
accords and ensure maximum publicity 
for every breach by the Indonesian army 
or the militias. 
• Insist on prosecution under proper legal 
procedures for all human rights 
violations and incitement to violence. 
• Ensure that there is international 
support, both practical and moral, for 
civil organisations in Indonesia and East 
Timor which are committed to seeing 
through the implementation of the 
accords. 
Analysis 
A window of 
opportunity 
The East Timorese have a chance to 
vote for their future on 8 August, but 
the opportunity to obtain 
independence might be short-lived. 
On 5 May the governments of Portugal and Indonesia signed a set of accords providing for a 
ballot on autonomy to be held in East 
Timor on 8 August, after the Indonesian 
elections of 7 June. The accords agreed 
modalities and security arrangements for 
the ballot, which will be conducted by the 
United Nations. A majority vote for 
autonomy will mean acceptance of 
Indonesian rule. If the vote goes against 
autonomy, authority over East Timor will 
pass to the United Nations, which will ini-
tiate a transition to independence. 
UN officials are starting to arrive in 
East Timor to make the logistical arrange-
ments. However, while President Habibie 
seems committed to the deal, the evidence 
shows that the Indonesian armed forces 
intend to obstruct it in every possible way. 
Security in the territory is poor. 
Militias backed by the Indonesian army 
are seeking to influence the outcome by 
terrorising supporters of East Timorese 
independence. The militias are composed 
of disaffected youth, criminals, West 
Timorese conscripts, regular soldiers in 
civilian dress and representatives of a 
small minority of East Timorese who have 
a genuine stake in continuing Indonesian 
rule; many members have been bribed or 
coerced into joining. They have perpe-
trated some of the worst violence, mass 
intimidation and killing that East Timar 
has seen since the 1991 Santa Cruz mas-
sacre. Hundreds of people have been killed 
in East Tin:ior since 27 January, when the 
Habibie government announced that it 
might be prepared to 'let East Timar go'. 
The militia leaders have benefited from 
army protection. They incite violence and 
murder with seemingly complete impunity. 
Their one objective: to make certain that 
East Timorese people are too frightened to 
vote for independence on 8 August. Death 
lists have been circulated containing the 
names of virtually all members of the 
National Council of Timorese Resistance 
(CNRT) as well as non-governmental organ-
isation and human rights workers. A 'peace 
agreement' signed by pro and anti-integra-
tionists on 21 April did nothing to change 
the situation, nor did the arrival in early 
April of UN officials. Indeed, incoming UN 
staff are also receiving threats. 
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Timor, area 7,400 square miles, is one of 
the easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The 
western part of the island, formerly a Dutch 
colony, belongs to Indonesia, whereas East 
Timor was for more than 400 years a 
Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal began decolonising 
East Timor. Newly formed political parties 
discussed options for the future. The 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially 
favoured federation with Portugal but then 
formed a coalition with Fretilin, the 
nationalist liberation movement, to demand 
independence. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a 
coup to pre-empt Indonesian threats to 
intervene if Fretilin came to power. In the 
ensuing civil war 1,500 people lost their 
lives. By September 1975, however, Fretilin 
was in control of virtually all of Portuguese 
Timor, following the defection of Timorese 
colonial troops to the liberation movement. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of a radical 
independent state, and continued to threaten 
East Timor despite previous assurances that 
Jakarta would respect the right of the East 
Timorese to independence. In September 
1975 Indonesia closed West Timor to 
journalists and on 7 December it launched a 
full-scale invasion of East Timar with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a fraudulent 
'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's '27th 
Province' in July 1976. The United Nations 
regards the annexation as illegal. 
The invasion and annexation of East 
Timar has been brutal: it is estimated that 
around 200,000 people, a third of the 
population, have died as a result of 
Indonesian rule. But the majority of 
Timorese have not accepted subjugation. 
Indonesia has been unable to eliminate the 
desire of the East Timorese for self-
determination and an armed resistance 
movement still remains in the hills. 
Kdom11t11 
In 1989 Indonesia opened up East 
Timar to the outside world. After a visit by 
Pope John Paul II in that year, East Timar 
gradually began to come to international 
attention. The failure of a promised 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal to 
arrive in 1991 provoked mass protests from 
the Timorese which Indonesia attempted to 
suppress, and led ultimately to a massacre 
in Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, in which the 
Indonesian army slaughtered almost 300 
people. Foreign journalists' footage of the 
massacre made East Timor a prominent 
human rights case and added impetus to 
the search for a solution under UN 
auspices. However, it took the Asian 
financial crisis of 1998 for real momentum 
for change to emerge from within 
Indonesia. 
The crucial change was the fall of 
General Suharto in May 1998, brought 
about by pressure from Indonesian civil 
society. His successor, his appointed deputy 
Yusuf Habibie announced in January 1999 
that Indonesia, which had begun 
negotiations with Portugal under UN 
auspices on an autonomy package for East 
Timor, might after all be prepared to 'let 
East Timor go' should its people reject 
autonomy. 
Accords signed by Indonesia and 
Portugal at the United Nations in New York 
on 5 May 1999 put in place a UN-
supervised process whereby East Timorese 
inside and outside the territory would vote 
on autonomy within Indonesia. Rejection of 
autonomy would amount to a vote for 
independence. The local army units, and 
possibly most of the Indonesian army, are 
implacably opposed to such a vote taking 
place. As UN personnel began arriving in 
East Timor to supervise the ballot, militias 
- armed, supplied and paid by the 
Indonesian army - went on the rampage, 
attacking and killing people suspected of 
pro-independence sympathies. More than 
300 people died between January and May 
1999, as preparations for the ballot went 
ahead. 
International advocacy and the East Timor ballot 
International advocacy and the East Timor ballot 
Preparations for the 8 August ballot on East Timor's future status are based on a series of agreements signed in New York by the Indonesian and Portuguese governments and 
the UN secretary-general. The accords include: 
• an agreement between the two governments for a popular 
consultation to be conducted by the United Nations; 
• an agreement on security arrangements; 
• an agreement on the preparations and procedures 
('modalities') for the vote; and 
• a memorandum on security which makes clear the UN 
secretary-general's requirements for the security 
arrangements to be provided by the Indonesian authorities. 
This memorandum was intended to be confidential, but its 
terms have been published on the internet. 
The accords have left loopholes for abuse of the ballot 
process by the Indonesian armed forces (formerly known as 
ABRI, but recently re-named Tentara Nasional Indonesia - TNI). 
The letter of the agreements is sure to be broken over and over 
again. However, this may be the only chance the East Timorese 
The accords 
Agreement between the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic 
on the Question of East Timer 
The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, 
Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514(XV), 1541(XV), 
2625(XXV) and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by 
the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of 
East Timor; 
Bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of 
Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices 
of the Secretary-General, to find a just, comprehensive and inter-
nationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor; 
Recalling the agreement of 5 August 1998 to undertake, under 
the auspices of the Secretary-General, negotiations on a special 
status based on a wideranging autonomy for East Timor without 
prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective 
Governments on the final status of East Timor; 
Having discussed a constitutional framework for an autonomy 
for East Timor on the basis of a draft presented by the United 
Nations, as amended by the Indonesian Government; 
Noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the 
proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an 
end solution to the question of East Timor with full recognition of 
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor; 
Noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an 
autonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recogni-
tion of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of 
East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the 
General Assembly, pending a final decision on the status of East 
Timor by the East Timorese people through an act of self-determi-
nation under United Nations auspices; 
Taking into account that although the Governments of 
Indonesia and Portugal each have their positions of principle on 
the prepared proposal for special autonomy, both agree that it is 
essential to move the peace process forward, and that therefore, 
the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal agree that the 
Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people on the 
will have to express their wishes on the territory's future . The 
international solidarity community should give the process 
maximum support to counter any effort from the TNI to subvert 
the ballot; however, it should also be prepared to declare, if 
necessary, that the degree of divergence has gone beyond 
tolerable limits. The East Timorese community, those inside East 
Timor in particular, are best placed to advise on this. 
The final arbiter of the process is the UN secretary-general, 
who has several UN resolutions to back his mandate. Resolution 
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the right to self-
determination, Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 
(1976) calling on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor 
without delay, and the eight resolutions of the General 
Assembly on East Timor are all relevant. They too can be used as 
yardsticks to measure the implementation of the accords. 
Below, we reprint the text of the accords in the column on 
the left. The comments in the column on the right analyse the 
implications of the agreements and make some proposals for 
international advocacy around the vote. 
Timor Link commentary/action 
Commentary and proposals for action related to the accords start 
in this column on page 4. 
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The accords 
constitutional fram ework for autonomy attached hereto as an 
annex; 
Bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and 
Portugal requested the Secretary-General to devise the method 
and procedures for the popular consultation through a direct, 
secret and universal ballot; 
Agree as follows : 
Article 1 
Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed con-
stitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East 
Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East 
Timorese people, both inside and outside East Timor, for their 
consideration and acceptance or rejection through a popular con-
sultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot. 
Article 2 
Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the 
signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission 
in East Timar to enable him to carry out the popular consultation 
effectively. 
Article 3 
The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining 
peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the 
popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in 
an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from 
any side. 
Article 4 
Request the Secretary-General to report the result of the popular 
consultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as 
well as to inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and 
the East Timorese people. 
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A UN presence is needed on the ground, as large as possible and 
as soon as possible. 
Action: 
• appeal to UN agencies, especially those with offices in Jakarta 
and elsewhere in Indonesia, to send staff, in addition to the 
UN team immediately concerned with setting up the ballot; 
• encourage international civil observers to visit East Timor from 
now on. These could be a mix of VIPs (to gain media profile), 
members of religious congregations - especially those with 
medical, language or communications skills - as well as non-
governmental organisation (NGO) workers, journalists, media 
experts, and so on. 
• press for extra flights to be laid on to East Timor. 
International solidarity efforts should concentrate on achieving 'an 
atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference'. 
Action: 
• call for a substantial increase in numbers of the Indonesian 
army to be confined to barracks or removed from East Timor, 
and for disarmament of the militias; 
• call for Indonesian soldiers not to be redeployed as police; 
• maintain international pressure on the Indonesian security 
forces to stay neutral; 
• insist that all human rights violations are prosecuted under 
international legal procedures; 
• use the media to push for the release of Xanana Gusmao, and 
for him and other East Timorese Resistance members to be 
allowed to return to East Timor in safety to campaign freely. 
Compile the calls made for his release by governments and 
send the compilation to those who have not yet done so; 
• send as many independent monitors as possible to East Timor, 
with the support of the East Timorese diocese and including 
VIPs, from now until 8 August. Coordination should ensure a 
substantial monitoring presence remains after the ballot. 
Whatever procedures are initiated after 8 August, the potential 
exists for large-scale violence. The United Nations must develop 
clear plans now for dealing with this. 
International advocacy and the East Timor ballot 
I The accords 
Article 5 
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of 
the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, 
that, the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy 
is acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of 
Indonesia shall initiate the constitutional measures necessary for 
the implementation of the constitutional framework, and the 
Government of Portugal shall initiate within the United Nations 
the procedures necessary for the removal of East Timar from the 
list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly 
and the deletion of the question of East Timar from the agendas 
of the Security Council and the General Assembly. 
Article 6 
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of 
the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, 
that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy 
is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of 
Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to termi-
nate its links with East Timar thus restoring under Indonesian law 
the status East Timar held prior to 17 July 1976, and the 
Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-
General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly 
transfer of authority in East Timar to the United Nations. The 
Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative 
mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timar to begin a 
process of transition towards independence. 
Article 7 
During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular 
consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, 
the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate 
United Nations presence in East Timar. 
DONE in New York on this 5th day of May, 1999. 
For the Government of Indonesia: 
Ali Alatas Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia 
For the Government of Portugal: 
Jaime Gama Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal 
Witnessed: 
Kofi A. Annan Secretary-General United Nations 
Agreement regarding the modalities for 
the popular consultation of the East 
Timorese through a direct ballot 
The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, 
Agree as follows: 
Immediately following the conclusion of the agreement between 
the two Governments requesting the Secretary-General to consult 
the East Timorese people on whether they would accept or reject 
the proposed constitutional framework for autonomy, the 
Secretary-General will, subject to the appropriate legislative 
Timor Link commentary/action 
If the East Timorese reject autonomy in the ballot, a highly 
volatile situation could well ensue. Indonesia should be prepared 
to take 'the necessary constitutional steps', but there is no 
timeframe attached. The Indonesian elections will precede the 
ballot in East Timor, and the newly-elected Majelis Permusyaratan 
Rakyat (MPR), the upper house of the Indonesian parliament, 
. might refuse to acknowledge the results of an agreement initiated 
by the current administration, which many Indonesians regard as 
transitional. A power vacuum following the ballot could mean 
local military or paramilitaries running amok in East Timor. 
Action: 
e ask the United Nations to clarify what the security 
arrangements are for a possible transfer of authority over East 
Timor from Indonesia to the United Nations. 
Action: 
• ask the United Nations to disclose what it regards as an 
'adequate presence', including the level of arms to be carried 
by police. 
It is not clear what would constitute 'adequate' UN personnel. 
The international solidarity community will need to seek guidance 
on this from partners in East Timar. 
Action: 
• monitor whether the UN staffing is adequate, in close 
consultation with partners on the ground; 
• if necessary, calf for more UN staff to be deployed. 
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mandate, begin preparat ion s fo r the popular consultat ion by 
deploying in East Timor such personnel as will be adequate for 
the purpose of executing the various phases of th e consultation 
process. Preparations for the vote outside East Timor will also 
begin at locations of major East Timorese concentration outside 
Eas t Timor. 
A. Date for consultation 
Th e ballot wi ll take place on Sunday, 8 August 1999, both inside 
and outside East Timor. 
B. Question to be put before the voters 
Th e question that the Secretary-General will put to th e voters is: 
'Do you accept th e proposed special autonomy - ACCEPT for 
East Timor within the Un itary State of the Republic of Indonesia? 
OR 
'Do you reject the proposed special auton omy - REJECT for 
East Timar, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia?' 
The Un ited Nations logo will appear on the ballot papers. Th e 
ballot papers will include symbols to facilitate vot in g by illiterate 
persons. 
C. Entitlement to vote 
The following persons, aged 17 years or above, sh all be eligible to 
vote in the popular consultat ion: 
(a) persons born in East Timar, 
(b) persons born outside East Timor but with at least on e parent 
having been born in East Timor, and 
(c) persons whose spouses fall under either of the two categories 
above. 
D. Schedule of the consultation process (in overlapping 
time periods) 
The sch edule for th e operational stages of the consultation 
process will be approximately as fo llows: 
Operational planning/Deployment 10 May-15 June 
Public information programme/Voter education 10 May-5 August 
Preparation and Registration 13 June - 17 July 
Exhibition of lists and challenges/Decisions on ch allenges and 
complaints 18July-23 July 
Political Campaign 20 July -5 August* 
Cooling off period 6 August- 7 August 
Polling Day 8 August 
* Subject to revision 
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Action: 
e consult with East Timorese partners as to how the East 
Timorese population can be adequately prepared to deal with 
the question on the ballot paper: is confusion likely to arise? If 
so, how can this be addressed? What symbols would be most 
appropriate for the ill iterate? 
The provision for the spouses of East Timorese to vote opens 
some potential for abuse. No minimum is set for duration of the 
marriage prior to the ballot, so in theory, Indonesian soldiers 
could try to coerce East Timorese into marriage to obtain a vote. 
There has been a history of Indones ian soldiers coercing East 
Timorese women into living with them as their wives, so this type 
of coercion (to vote either way) is also a possibility. 
This period overlaps with the Indonesian elections on 7 June, 
which could disrupt preparations for the ballot on autonomy. In 
the Indonesian election, the limited numbers participating in East 
Timor are likely to have voted for the government party, Golkar. 
There is a danger that governments internationally might view 
this election result as indicating the probable outcome of the 8 
August ballot. The pro-integrationists are likely to use the election 
results in their campaigns. 
Action: 
e make clear, especially to the international media, the 
difference between the Indonesian elections and the East 
Timor vote; 
e persuade international media to remain in East Timor 
throughout; 
e explore with foreign governments the possibility of stationing 
permanent representatives (short of consulates) in East Timor. 
International advocacy and the East Timor ballot 
The accords 
E. Operational Phases 
a) Information Campaign 
The United Nations will make available the text of the main 
Agreement and the autonomy document to be voted on in the 
following languages: Tetun, Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese and 
English. 
The United Nations will disseminate and explain the content 
of the main Agreement and the autonomy document in an impar-
tial and factual manner inside and outside East Timar. 
The United Nations will explain to voters the process and pro-
cedure of the vote, and the implications of an 'accept' or 'reject' 
vote. 
The radio stations and the newspapers in East Timar as well as 
other Indonesian and Portuguese media outlets will be utilized in 
the dissemination of this information. Other appropriate means 
of dissemination will be made use of as required. 
b) Registration 
Registration inside and outside East Timar will take place for a 
continuous period of 20 days. 
Two hundred registration centres will be opened in East Timar 
for this purpose. 
Outside East Timar, special registration centres will be opened 
in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Ujung Pandang, 
Sydney, Darwin, Perth, Melbourne, Lisbon, Maputo, Macau, New 
York with adjustments to be made as appropriate. The United 
Nations may utilize the services of the Australian Electoral 
Commission for the balloting in Australia and of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Portugal and 
elsewhere. 
The registration lists will be exhibited for five days at the end 
of the registration period at the respective registration centres, 
regional offices and at Dili headquarters. Challenges to the lists 
shall be submitted to the regional offices for a final decision by 
the Electoral Commission prior to polling day. 
c) Campaign 
Supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal will cam-
paign ahead of the vote in a peaceful and democratic manner 
during the period designated for this purpose. 
There will be a Code of Conduct for the campaign, to be pro-
posed by the United Nations and discussed with the supporters 
and opponents of the autonomy proposal. 
The United Nations will devise the means to provide equal 
opportunity for the two sides to disseminate their views to the 
public. 
Officials of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal will 
Timor Link commentary/action 
Interference in public information has already started . Militias 
wrecked the Dili office of the Timorese daily newspaper Suara 
Timar Timur on the weekend of 1 7-18 April. Attempts to 
intimidate voters have already compromised the army and 
militia's role. People are being forced to sign pledges to vote for 
autonomy, are being threatened with losing their jobs, and are 
being physically attacked. 
The United Nations is supposed to explain the agreement: it 
should be allowed to do its work. Newspapers, radio and TV 
should only be used by the United Nations in the dissemination 
of neutral information about the ballot. 
The international solidarity movement needs to monitor the 
public information period closely, in collaboration with East 
Timorese partners and as many international observers as possible 
on the ground. This will require good coordination and clear 
division of responsibilities. 
Action: 
• East Timorese monitoring groups, international human rights 
groups and non-governmental organisations should work 
together to ensure that every act of intimidation is 
documented and reported to the United Nations; 
• ensure international media publicity about such abuses; 
• check translations of the texts the United Nations will be 
making available to ensure accuracy. 
• special efforts need to be made to ensure that information 
reaches women, the elderly, the illiterate and those in 
outlying areas. 
This is a key time for large-scale electoral malpractice. The time 
allotted for checking voter registration is very short, and it is 
unclear how challenges will be substantiated. There is no 
provision so far for a voter registration centre for East Timorese 
living in the UK. Such a centre should be set up in London, 
preferably on UN property. 
Action: 
• move in international observers, preferably experienced 
election monitors, to observe procedures and watch for fraud. 
Monitors who have served in recent elections - Cambodia, 
South Africa, Namibia, and so on - should be recruited and 
sent in as swiftly as possible. This will require coordination 
with East Timorese partners inside East Timor, as well as 
international cooperation; 
• set up a thorough coverage for list inspection, in collaboration 
with local East Timorese. Irregularities in the voters' list should 
be reported to the United Nations; 
• clarify whether people must vote in the place where they 
register, because many East Timorese may wish to travel to 
East Timor to vote. 
• provision must be made for those not living in nominated 
centres (eg East Timorese in the UK). 
Any campaigning will provide an opportunity for clashes. 
Coercion by the army and paramilitaries is likely. It is not yet clear 
if decisions made by East Timorese not to vote will be respected, 
or what difference, if any, the United Nations and international 
presence already there will make. 
The ban on government officials campaigning in support of 
either option in the ballot covers Indonesian soldiers and police, 
but they are likely to breach this provision throughout the 
campaign period. East Timor's governor, Abilio Soares, has 
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not participate in the campaign in support of either option. 
East Timorese government officials may campaign in their 
personal capacity. All such campaigning will be carried out strictly 
according to the Code of Conduct without use of public funds 
and government resources or recourse to pressure of office. 
Timor Link commentary/action 
already had recourse to public funds to ram home his opposition 
to the ballot. 
Action: 
• campaign for the release of Xanana Gusmao so that he can 
go home to East Timor to campaign. This will be the major 
campaigning point for international supporters. Xanana 
would rally opinion, which is presumably why the Indonesian 
government is refusing to let him out of prison 'for his own 
safety'. His release agreement should include guarantees of 
safety from the Indonesian armed forces, and UN 
international police protection; 
• campaign for the release of remaining political prisoners, so 
that they can go home to vote; 
• give international publicity to the Code of Conduct for the 
campaign period once it is made public by the United 
Nations, so that breaches of it can be highlighted; 
e expose any participation in campaigning by Indonesian 
soldiers and police; 
• monitor the activities of Soares and other officials - both East 
Timorese and Indonesian - for signs of disproportionate 
resources behind their personal campaigning work. This 
should be reported to the United Nations and exposed 
internationally. 
d) Balloting in East Timor ------------------------------------------
Voting in East Timar will take place in approximately 700 registra-
tion/polling stations located in 200 polling centres. 
e} Balloting outside East T,imor 
Voting will take place in polling stations set up in the same loca-
tions as the registration centres mentioned above. 
f) Observers 
Indonesia and Portugal shall be entitled to send an equal number 
of representatives to observe all the operational phases of the con-
sultation process both inside and outside East Timar. 
International observers will be able to observe the consulta-
tion process under terms to be developed by the United Nations 
to regulate their presence. 
F) Funding 
The Secretary-General will seek the approval of the Security 
Council for the operation in order to ensure assessed budgetary 
funding. Voluntary contributions will be channeled through a 
Trust Fund established for this purpose. 
G} Security 
The Indonesian authorities will ensure a secure environment for a 
free and fair popular consultation process and will be responsible 
for the security of United Nations personnel. A number of United 
Nations security guards will be deployed to ensure the security 
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If there are to be 700 polling stations, it would be desirable to 
have at least 1400 observers in East Timor, from both UN and 
independent sources. This may be unrealistic. The minimum 
would be 700. 
Action: 
e keep abreast of agreements on numbers of observers. 
The agreement does not suggest numbers for Indonesian and 
Portuguese observers. Most probably, the vast majority of 
Portuguese observers (of whom there will be at least 40) will be 
biased in favour of independence, while the vast majority of 
Indonesian observers favour autonomy. This could give rise to 
friction between the two groups in a highly charged atmosphere. 
Action: 
• clarify with your own government how many other 
international observers will be allowed in to monitor, both 
officially and unofficially; 
• obtain the terms of reference for the international observers 
from the UN. 
In signing these accords, the Indonesian authorities have agreed 
to ensure a secure environment for a free and fair popular 
consultation process. Every instance where they fail to do so must 
be exposed. The level of insecurity may well grow to the point 
International advocacy and the East Timor ballot 
The accords 
and safety of United Nations personnel and property. A number 
of international civilian police will be available in East Timor to 
advise the Indonesian Police during the operational phases of the 
popular consultation and, at the time of the consultation, to 
supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from 
polling sites. 
DONE in New York on this 5th day of May, 1999. 
For the Government of Indonesia, Ali Alatas Minister for 
Foreign Affairs 
For the United Nations, Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General 
For the Government of Portugal, Jaime Gama, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs 
East Timor popular consultation 
Agreement regarding security 
The Government of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, 
Agree as follows : 
1. A secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of 
intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair 
ballot in East Timor. Responsibility to ensure such an environ-
ment as well as for the general maintenance of law and order 
rests with the appropriate Indonesian security authorities. The 
absolute neutrality of the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) and 
the Indonesian Police is essential in this regard. 
2. The Commission on Peace and Stability established in Dili on 
21 April 1999 should become operational without delay. The 
Commission, in cooperation with the United Nations, will 
Tim or Link commentary I action 
where it jeopardises the vote. On this, the international solidarity 
community must take its cue from the East Timorese. Good 
communication systems and networks with a reserve of reputable 
journalists willing to report information will be essential. 
It is planned that 272 international civilian police will be 
deployed. Language skills will be a huge asset - presumably most 
likely to be found among Australian police. But thought needs to 
be given now to how police might be sent on short intensive 
language training courses. 
Security for UN personnel will be crucial, not because the lives 
of foreigners are more precious than those of Timorese, but 
because the killing of a UN official would become a big 
international issue. It could even derail the whole UN process. 
The paramilitaries might orchestrate such an incident and blame 
the East Timorese armed resistance, Falintil. Militias have openly 
threatened UN personnel. 
Action: 
• prepare early for effective, rapid communication of verified 
incidents; 
• international solidarity groups, especially in Australia, Japan, 
the US, Britain, Germany and the Philippines should contact 
their governments and arrange proper briefings for police 
assigned to East Timar; 
• it might be appropriate for the National Council of Timorese 
Resistance (CNRT) and international supporters, particularly 
those whose countries are on the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
regularly to brief the Security Council members. It will be the 
UNSC which takes any decision to deploy peace-keepers at a 
later stage. The secretary-general will be reporting to the 
UNSC on the proceedings of the ballot. With an informed 
membership, security questions will debated more 
responsibly. 
However well-founded the anxieties about the TNI being 
responsible for security and law and order before and during the 
ballot, that is their official role. The international solidarity 
community should monitor their performance, and assess 
whether the cumulative impact of the breaches which are sure to 
occur is serious enough to invalidate the voting . 
Action: 
• monitor the accords and ensure maximum publicity for every 
breach. A clear and internationally verifiable listing is needed, 
with times, dates, names, and so on; 
• a separate grouping with experience, for example in the 
former Yugoslavia, might be sent in to train East Timorese in 
the documentation of violations in accordance with 
International Criminal Court standards, and to ensure that all 
reporting is produced in that style. 
The United Nations should do more than participate fully in the 
Commission on Peace and Stability set up in Dili to oversee the 
process. It should chair it. The CNRT should be represented on 
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elaborate a code of conduct, by which all parties should abide, 
for the period prior to and following the consultation, ensure 
the laying down of arms and take th e necessary steps to 
achieve disarmament. 
3. Prior to the start of the regist ration , the Secretary-General 
shall ascertain, based on the objective evaluation of the UN 
mission, that the necessary security situation exists for the 
peaceful implementation of the consultation process. 
4. The police will be solely responsible for the maintenance of law 
and order. The Secretary-General, after obtaining the necessary 
mandate, will make available a number of civilian police officers 
to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of 
their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the 
escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites. 
DONE in New York on this 5th day of May 1999 
For the Government of Portugal 
Jaime Gama Minister for Foreign Affairs Portugal 
For the United Nations 
Kofi A. Annan Secretary-General United Nations 
For the Government of Indonesia 
Ali Alatas Min ister for Foreign Affairs Indonesia 
The fo llowing is the unpublished memorandum by the UN secretary-
general elaborating on his expectations concerning security fo r the con-
sultation. Indonesia has agreed to this. 
Memorandum 
The Secretary-General has been entrusted by the Governments of 
Indonesia and Portugal to organize and conduct a popular consul-
tation in East Timor by the 8th August 1999. He wishes to share 
with the two Governments some elements that are usual require-
ments in United Nations operations of this kind. While under the 
provisions of the Security Agreement it is Indonesia's responsi-
bility to ensure that a peaceful environment exists for the holding 
of a free and fair ballot, the Secretary-General has been called 
upon to ascertain that the necessary security situation exists for 
the peaceful implementation of the consultation process. 
Therefore, the Secretary-General wishes to convey to the two 
parties the main elements that will need to be in place in order to 
enable him to determine that the necessary security conditions exist 
for the start of the operational phases of the consultation process: 
1) as an urgent first step, the bringing of armed civilian groups 
under strict control and discipline; 
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the committee, preferably by Xanana Gusmao in person . 
The accords appear to d istinguish between the 'laying down 
of arms' (implying a voluntary gesture) and 'disarmament' which 
is presumably the desired result of further negotiations. Francese 
Vendrell, who is on the staff of ]amsheed Marker, UN special 
representative for East Timor, referred in a statement of 10 May 
to the 'laying down of arms' by early July. It appears, therefore, 
that the paramilitaries will be under little pressure to lay down 
their arms immediately, st ill less will anyone 'dis-a rm' them. These 
formulations show the weakness of the UN position on security. 
The code of conduct mentioned is very important, but it will take 
time before it is agreed, let alone acted upon. 
Action: 
• the international solidarity community, with guidance from 
the East Timorese on the ground, should come to a consensus 
on the security situation in East Timor before the UN 
secretary-general makes his announcement, and make its view 
known publicly beforehand. 
TNI chief General Wiranto has publicly mentioned the possibility 
that the Indonesian armed forces could be ' redeployed' as police; 
according to East Timorese sources this has already been done. 
This is a real danger. A Timorese group based in Darwin has 
offered its services to accompany Australian police and help with 
their language skills and local knowledge. (They are Australian 
citizens, but have asked to be able to vote, while refraining from 
any political campaigning .) Their offer has had no response so tar. 
Action: 
• lobby against the Indonesian government being allowed to 
dress soldiers up in police uniforms; 
• lobby for more foreign police observers, and approach the 
foreign ministries of the countries that will be supplying them 
to offer to brief them properly. 
• set up channels of communication with police advisers to 
bring breaches/anomalies to their attention. 
These groups were created by the army in the first place, so it is 
unlikely even to pretend to bring them under control. Time and 
again, army officers have encouraged these groups to carry on 
their murderous campaigns. 
International advocacy and the East Timor ballot 
The accords 
2) an immediate ban on rallies by armed groups while ensuring 
the freedom of all political groups and tendencies, including 
both pro-integration elements and also the CNRT and other 
pro-independence forces, to organize and conduct peaceful 
political activities; 
3) the prompt arrest and prosecution of those who incite or 
threaten to use violence against others. In this connection, it 
has been noted with concern that public threats have already 
been issued to the United Nations by certain individuals; 
4) assumption by the Indonesian Police of sole responsibility for 
the maintenance of law and order; 
5) redeployment of Indonesian military forces; 
6) free access to the mass media for the United Nations as well as 
both sides of the political divide in East Timor; 
7) full participation of the United Nations in the Commission on 
Peace and Stability, which should provide a forum for all 
parties to address and resolve effectively issues relating to com-
pliance with the agreement during the consultative process 
and for resolving disputes and frictions on the ground; and 
8) the immediate institution of a process of laying down of arms 
by all armed groups, to be completed well in advance of the 
holding of the ballot. 
4 May 1999 
Tim or Link commentary I action 
The text does not even mention laying down of arms, let 
alone disarmament, despite Vendrell's comments about laying 
down of arms ',?Yearly July' . 
Action: 
e keep a documented record of every time the armed forces 
overtly encourage or covertly support the armed civilian 
groups. 
Xanana Gusmao should be allowed to return to East Timor to 
campaign. 
Action: 
e with CNRT leaders currently in hiding, an announcement to 
re-open the CNRT offices should be monitored in order to 
facilitate it. 
Since the accords were signed on 5 May, politically motivated 
killings have continued to be reported daily. 
Although militia leaders such as Eurico Guterres (now civil 
defence officer in East Timor), Jose Tavares and Cancio Cavalho . 
have openly incited armed groups to murder, the authorities 
seem to have given them the freedom of East Timor to conduct 
themselves with impunity. They have not even been 
reprimanded, let alone prosecuted. 
Action: 
e put pressure on the Indonesian authorities to bring these 
people to justice, under the terms of the UN agreement. All 
perpetrators of human rights violations should now be 
subjected to proper legal proceedings. 
At present, it is not clear who or what will constitute the Indonesian 
police force. It may well be expanded by the redeployment of 
Indonesian soldiers issued with new uniforms. Nor is it clear how 
the Indonesian army will be limited in its activity, or whether some 
battalions will be withdrawn from Timor. Will the police include the 
Indonesian police commando forces, BRIMOB? 
This should not mean redeploying the military into the police, but 
a reduction and withdrawal of the army, monitored by 
independent observers. 
It is not clear who will monitor this and what the procedures will 
be: how state media operating from outside Timor can be 
influenced, or how local radio stations can be protected from 
coercion. The Catholic Radio Station (Radio Kmanek) and RDP in 
Lisbon could perhaps be of assistance here. 
The UN should chair the commission - or perhaps it should be 
chaired by an Ombudsman figure of international stature, given 
that some disputes may involve UN personnel. 
On 10 May Francese Vendrell stated that armed groups must lay 
down their arms by the beginning of July. This is already a revision 
of the agreement. If they are not disarmed until then, the whole of 
the first part of the process, including .most of the crucial voter 
registration period, is taking place in an armed environment. 
Here the wording is no longer about 'armed civilian groups' . 
Presumably, therefore, it includes Falintil. The UN would not refer 
to the TNI as 'armed groups' so they must be excluded by this 
wording. This is an anomaly which campaigning groups should 
challenge. 
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UN Security Council Resolution on East Timor 
On 7 May the UN Security Council 
passed the following resolution in 
response to a report from the UN 
secretary-general on the accords 
between Portugal and Indonesia. 
The resolution paves the way for the 
United Nations to play its part in 
implementing the accords. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its previous resolutions on 
the situation in East Timar, 
Recalling also General Assembly 
resolution 1514 (XV), 1541 (XV) and 
2625 (XXV) and the resolutions of the 
General Assembly on the question of East 
Tim or, in particular resolution 3 7 /30, 
Bearing in mind the sustained efforts 
of the Governments of Indonesia and 
Portugal since July 1983, through the 
good offices of the Secretary-General, to 
find a just, comprehensive and 
internationally acceptable solution to the 
question of East Timar, 
Welcoming the progress made at the 
last round of talks between the 
Governments of Portugal and Indonesia, 
under the auspices of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, leading to 
the conclusion of a series of agreements 
in New York on 5 May 1999, 
Commending in particular the efforts 
of the Personal Representative of the 
Secretary-General in this regard, 
Taking note of the report of the 
Secretary-General (S/1999 I 513), 
Taking note of the concerns expressed 
in the report of the Secretary-General 
regarding the security situation in East 
Timar, 
1. Welcomes the concluding of the 
Agreement between Indonesia and 
Portugal on 5 May 1999 on the 
question of East Timar (the General 
Agreement) (S/1999/513, Annex I) ; 
2. Welcomes also the concluding of the 
Agreements between the United 
Nations and the Governments of 
Indonesia and Portugal on the same 
date regarding security arrangements 
(S/1999/513, Annex III) and the 
modalities for the popular 
consultation of the East Timorese 
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through a direct ballot (S/1999/513, 
Annex II) ; 
3. Welcomes further the intention of the 
Secretary-General to establish as soon 
as practicable a United Nations 
presence in East Timar, with a view to 
assisting in the implementation of 
these Agreements in particular 
through: 
(a) Conducting a popular consultation 
of the East Timorese people on the 
acceptance or rejection of a 
constitutional framework for an 
autonomy for East Timor, 
scheduled for 8 August 1999, in 
accordance with the General 
Agreement; 
(b) Making available a number of 
civilian police officers to act as 
advisers to the Indonesian Police 
in the discharge of their duties in 
East Timor and, at the time of the 
consultation, to supervise the 
escort of ballot papers and boxes 
to and from the polling sites; 
4. Stresses the importance of the 
requests made to the Secretary-
General in the General Agreement to 
report the result of the popular 
consultation to the Security Council 
and the General Assembly, as well as 
to the Governments of Indonesia and 
Portugal and the East Timorese 
people, and, during the interim period 
between the conclusion of the 
popular consultation and the start of 
the implementation of either option, 
an autonomy within Indonesia or 
transition to independence, to 
maintain an adequate United Nations 
presence in East Timar; 
5. Stresses also the responsibility of the 
Government of Indonesia to maintain 
peace and security in East Timor in 
order to ensure that the consultation 
is carried out in a fair and peaceful 
way and in an atmosphere free of 
intimidation, violence or interference 
from any side and to ensure the safety 
and security of United Nations and 
other international staff and observers 
in East Timar; 
6. Stresses further the importance of the 
assistance of the Government of 
Indonesia in ensuring that the United 
Nations is able to carry out all the 
tasks entrusted to it for the 
implementation of the Agreements; 
7. Welcomes the establishment by the 
Secretary-General of a Trust Fund to 
enable Member States to make 
voluntary contributions to assist in 
the financing of the United Nations 
presence in East Timor, and urges all 
Member States who are in a position 
to do so to contribute without delay; 
8. Requests the Secretary-General to keep 
the Security Council closely informed 
of the situation in East Timor, to 
report to it as soon as possible, and in 
any event by 24 May, on the 
implementation of this resolution and 
of the Agreements referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, inter alia 
specifying the detailed modalities of 
the consultation process, to make 
detailed recommendations to the 
Council for decision on the mandate, 
size, structure and budget of the 
United Nations Mission, including 
civilian police officers envisaged in 
paragraph 3 above, and to report to 
the Council thereafter every fourteen 
days; 
9. Expresses its intention to take a 
prompt decision on the establishment 
of a United Nations Mission on the 
basis of the report referred to in 
paragraph 8 above; 
10. Requests the Secretary-General to 
inform the Council prior to the start 
of voter registration on whether, on 
the basis of the objective evaluation 
of the United Nations Mission, the 
necessary security situation exists for 
the peaceful implementation of the 
consultation process; 
11. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
Source: Security Council Press Release 
SC/6672 3998th Meeting (PM) 7 May 1999 
• Timar Link notes: Security Council 
Resolution 1246 passed unanimously on 11 
June 1999, established the United Nations 
Mission in East Timor. The text provides for 
political, electoral and information 
components and authorises up to 280 
civilian police officials to act as advisers to 
the Indonesian police and 50 military liaison 
officers. The Council urged the swift 
operationalising of the Commission on 
Peace and Stability so that a code of 
conduct could be elaborated for all parties 
to use during the consultation process. 
Analysis 
Policing the transition: 
Churches and the international 
community before the referendum 
by Ian Linden 
M ingled with hope, there is a ter-rible sense of deja vu in what is happening in East Timor: the 
Nobel peace prizes have been awarded, the 
resistance leader 'released', but the army 
has been privatising bloody repression 
through militias and vigilantes to block a 
settlement. These are all established end-
game moves in the history of 20th century 
armed conflict. 
Ten years ago, CIIR published a collec-
tion of essays called States of Terror 
analysing the phenomenon of state-spon-
sored violence in South Africa, the 
Philippines, Central America and Haiti. 
'Just as the poor throw up leaders and 
popular movements with nationalist and 
democratic goals, progressive and threat-
ening', went the introduction, 'so from 
the same social topsoil grow warlords and 
gangs, led by traditional authoritarian 
figures to oppose them violently[ ... ] The 
degree to which the state "creates" this 
counter-force and the degree to which it 
moulds and directs a pre-existent organic 
reaction to development varies from 
country to country.' 
Blocking the ballot 
There is no doubt that we are watching 
these tactics employed in East Timor. The 
police stand back as vigilante groups 
attack; the special forces unit Kopassus 
makes sure that its proxy forces are armed 
and able to move around the country; 
death lists circulate to intimidate those 
named. And the risk that key figures in the 
resistance movement will be assassinated 
grows. 
On 8 August, the East Timorese are due 
to vote, either for autonomy within 
Indonesia or independence. And, on cue, 
the killing has gained momentum. The 
objective of this increased paramilitary 
activity is to make a free and fair refer-
endum impossible. The comparison is not 
the Namibian independence elections, 
where an effective UN presence reduced 
levels of violence, but Haiti before the US 
invasion, where elections were held under 
the brutal control of the Haitian military 
and the Tontons Macoutes auxiliaries with 
appalling bloodshed. 
So the international community and 
Election monitors in South Africa, 1994, checking the deployment of security forces. 
the Indonesian government should stop 
pretending that polite exchanges in New 
York and Lisbon about policing the 
autonomy package make any sense 
without a substantial international pres-
ence in all parts of East Timor. When 
Nobel prize winner Bishop Belo goes in 
fear of his life and police have to protect 
his house, it is obvious that a sizeable 
armed UN peace-keeping presence and an 
experienced force of international moni-
tors must be deployed at least two months 
before the referendum. 
The 20 April agreement between pro-
and anti-integrationists to cease hostilities 
was a publicity stunt and did not substan-
tially alter the intimidating atmosphere in 
East Timor. It is unreasonable to expect 
the people to vote freely without solid 
international support on the ground. 
East Timor is a tiny country, but that 
does not detract from its right to self-
determination and protection of its citi-
zens' human rights. If an air armada can 
be marshalled with the intention of 
bombing Serbia into civilised behaviour, 
cannot Indonesia be impressed, though 
more peacefully, to accept an effective UN 
and international presence? This is essen-
tial to resolve the East Timor crisis; a small 
number of imported police is not enough. 
A role for the churches 
Is there a role here for the churches? 
Obviously yes, in that the Catholic church 
in East Timor has played a major role in 
the struggle for human rights and self-
determination, and has gained interna-
tional credibility through it. A comparison 
with South Africa suggests the kind of 
action that has some chance of success. 
The South African transition, which 
was no less bloody than East Timor's, also 
took place with the armed forces of a 
hostile state in control and a small inter-
national monitoring force on the ground. 
But those armed forces could expect some 
role in the new order in South Africa. In 
East Timor they will not, and are therefore 
likely to be more determined to thwart a 
settlement. Some of the most effective 
monitors belonged to the Ecumenical 
Monitoring Programme in South Africa 
(EMPSA) established in August 1992 as a 
church programme for peace. 
Active monitoring 
EMPSA aimed to monitor the conduct of 
negotiations and the electoral proceed-
ings, and monitor violence in the context 
of the political process. But it was not 
simply an observer. Active monitoring 
included the promotion of dialogue 
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between warring parties so, wherever pos-
sible, EMPSA became involved in media-
tion and facilitating peaceful resolution of 
local and regional conflicts. At times, the 
presence of monitors provided a buffer 
against violent confrontation. 
Almost 450 people from Europe, Africa 
and Asia, endorsed by their churches, were 
deployed as field monitors for stretches of 
about six weeks, working alongside the 
UN, Commonwealth and local monitors. 
During the critical two-year period before 
Nelson Mandela was sworn in as presi-
dent, three 'Eminent Persons' groups 
visited as part of the programme. The pro-
gramme, although sponsored by the 
World Council of Churches, relied almost 
entirely on the strength of the local 
churches and their capacity to facilitate 
the work of the field monitors at all levels. 
This demanded a courageous willingness 
by the local EMPSA co-ordinators to take 
personal risks for peace-building. 
Would such a model work in East 
Timor? It will not be without risk and it 
will not be easy. The capacity of the South 
African churches to host such an 
endeavour was far greater than that of the 
Catholic church in East Timor today. There 
was a 'critical mass' of clergy and religious 
The terror 
continues 
The JOSEPHITE SISTERS in Sydney, 
Australia, received this letter from a 
partner organisation in East Timor. 
/The terror campaign continues in 
East Timor. We have been com-
municating with our friends in 
East Timor who are all living in fear. We 
quote them as follows: 
'When are the UN coming? When are 
the Australian Police coming? Our friends 
say: "We are just waiting around to die." 
At night we cannot sleep. We have to stay 
awake, waiting for any sound or move-
ment. If anything happens we must be 
prepared to run. We must look after our 
family somehow. They come at any time. 
Ransack our houses, steal possessions, 
destroy property and people. Whatever 
they see they claim. We are not safe. They 
kill us worse than animals. And the Police, 
they do nothing. They only come after the 
killings have taken place. Snickering and 
pretending to uphold the law. Only after 
the killings take place, then they come 
and pretend to reprimand the culprits. 
They are on drugs, these pro-Indonesian 
killers. The Indonesians call the drug anjin 
gila which means mad dog and they are so 
high that only after their faces are clear do 
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from several different churches willing to 
commit themselves to the EMPSA pro-
gramme inside South Africa. They had 
good communications and a well-
resourced church justice infrastructure, 
after several years of focussed funding 
from the European Union and other 
bodies. Even if the two Catholic dioceses 
in East Timor put all their personnel 
behind such an endeavour, they could not 
possibly handle the numbers that went 
into and were needed in South Africa. Even 
the EMPSA programme almost buckled 
under the pressures and could only 
manage the influx with great difficulty. 
Making a difference 
A smaller and more modest programme of 
monitoring based on the existing church 
network could, with the support of church 
leaders, make a significant contribution to 
peace-building. Selection of incoming mon-
itors for the variety of skills needed in con-
flict situations would need to be more rig-
orous than was the case for South Africa. 
Communications would have to be 
improved because isolated, out-of-touch 
monitors in mountainous areas would run 
great risks. The level and scope of activity 
would depend on what the two bishops see 
they realise that they have killed a friend 
or relation. They are threatened to take 
part in the killings or else their families or 
they themselves will be killed. Some 
cannot escape at all. After so many years 
of being caught up in corrupt activities, 
they cannot get out. The Indonesians 
have paid them too much over the years 
that they now own them. Maybe Australia 
and the UN are owned by them as well. 
'The Police and the Military are behind 
all of this . [ . .. ] The truth is that the 
Indonesian Military do not want to let go 
of East Timor. They feel that they have 
invested too much to lose it so easily. They 
have given too many of their lives for East 
Timor. Their business investments in East 
Timor are too great to give up. The 
problem is that BJ Habibie did not fully 
consult the military before making his 
decision to allow East Timor a vote on 
autonomy. The military are against 
autonomy or independence. They want 
status quo. A vote on autonomy without a 
doubt means independence. They know 
our hearts are not with them. 
'A young man was brutally killed the 
other day, Flavito Ribeiro, 24 years old. He 
was at his sister's house in Audian when 
the pro-Indonesian group arrived. They 
shot and then stabbed and hacked him to 
death. His older brother had to run and 
leave him to die alone. Their house was 
burned. His body was later buried in the 
front yard of his parents' home. The 
family couldn't even change his clothes. 
as feasible. 
At the very least, 'Eminent Persons' 
groups ought to visit at regular intervals. 
As in South Africa, these would have easier 
access to key parties, the voting process for 
the referendum, and military leaders. It 
would be important, given the limited 
capacity and resources, that such visits did 
not take up too much time of church per-
sonnel. Trusted translators would be 
highly valued. 
Having participated in one of the 
EMPSA 'Eminent Persons' visits and with 
CIIR having supported the EMPSA initia-
tive in South Africa, I have no doubt that 
East Timor would benefit from a similar 
programme. It was often said that the 
EMPSA monitors, because they lived close 
to the people, came into play just when the 
official UN personnel went home to bed, at 
precisely the time when trouble often 
began. Thus their presence made a differ-
ence. If the churches are to make their soli-
darity with East Timor real, it is not enough 
to call on the United Nations and others to 
play their role without 'drinking from our 
own wells' and finding our own effective 
response from our history and experience. 
Ian Linden 
Executive director, CllR 
This is just one incident. Just imagine the 
ones that have gone unreported and in 
remote areas! 
'If UN Peace Keeping Force do not 
come soon, what will become of us? We 
have no choice but to just wait here to die. 
We have nowhere to run. If we can get out 
of here we will do so. If there is any evacu-
ation programme please include us. There 
are many here ready to leave. We are 
aware that Australia has accepted many 
Kosovo people. Why not East Timor? If 
Timor was connected onto another land 
mass, another country, then we could 
cross over. Those who are fortunate have 
managed to escape to Bali or Jakarta. Even 
though some of the militia people are also 
there, at least it is not as tight as it is here 
in Timor. They are truly the fortunate 
ones, what about us poor ones? Your gov-
ernment, the Australian government, 
have the blackest hearts. 
'The religious in East Timor will have a 
silent march from the Cathedral to 
Lecidere on 13 May in the afternoon.* The 
march will be composed of some 400-plus 
East Timorese religious as well as support 
and solidarity from religious from Kupang 
and Atambua (many of them are already 
in Dili and will be marching alongside 
their East Timorese brothers and sisters). 
All we can ask you all to do is pray for us. 
Pray that we are not all wiped out. Pray 
that the world community wakes up to 
what is actually happening here.' 
*The march went off without incident. 
News from East Timor 
Bishop Belo speaks out 
In a telephone interview with East 
Timor activist ARNOLD KOHEN on 
31 May 1999, Bishop Carlos Ximenes 
Belo gave a trenchant analysis of the 
violence unleashed by the Indonesian 
military in the period leading up to the 
consultation on independence 
scheduled for 8 August 1999. 
/The Indonesians know that they 
will lose the referendum if people 
are free to vote,' Bishop Belo 
affirmed. 'This is why they have developed 
a strategy to make a free vote impossible.' 
More than 1000 secret service agents 
have been sent to East Timor as well as two 
new infantry companies, the bishop said. 
'They are infiltrating everywhere. When 
you hear about militia attacks, they are 
always part of the militia groups. They 
push the militias, they give the orders and 
they themselves shoot.' 
Five western districts are already under 
their control, he said, including Liquica, 
Ainaro, Ermera and Oecussi. 
'People will be forced to vote for 
autonomy. Part of the strategy is not to 
pay civil servants their salaries until they 
have signed a document stating that they 
are for autonomy. In Aileu, the entire pop-
ulation is being threatened with death 
unless they vote for autonomy. People are 
being told that either they vote for 
autonomy or they will be killed,' Bishop 
Belo stated. 
'Everyone is very afraid. The resistance is 
not appearing in Dili any more, because it is 
too dangerous, there is no security. Under 
these circumstances you cannot have a ref-
• 
A tense few months and the threat of continuing violence face the East Timorese in their struggle 
for independence. 
erendum in peace and freedom,' he said 
'It is necessary that there be an inter-
national military force here. A police force 
by itself is insufficient. This military force 
must be present in all villages and admin-
istrative posts,' the bishop emphasised. 
Indonesian President Habibie and 
armed forces commander General Wiranto 
have to be told that they have to disarm 
the militias before the referendum can go 
forward, Bishop Belo said. 'Otherwise it is 
better not to have a referendum.' 
At present, the Indonesian military 
strategy is to eliminate anyone who might 
vote for independence, the bishop 
declared. 'They burn the houses, they kill 
the young people. As a result, the numbers 
of people supporting independence are 
diminishing. While all this happens, there 
is no working justice system, while houses 
are being burned and people are being 
killed in Dili, there is not even an attempt 
to bring anyone to justice, to imprison 
those responsible or anything else[ ... ] it is 
as if this state of affairs was normal.' 
If this continues, the bishop said, 'The 
dream of the people for freedom will lose 
by force' . 
The bishop also expressed concern 
over the estimated 40,000 internally dis-
placed people who face a food crisis. The 
New York Times reported on 27 May that 
the militias were blocking relief groups 
from delivering aid to the refugees. 
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New publications from CllR 
Humanising Peace: The impact of 
peace agreements on human rights. 
Lessons from Guatemala, Haiti and 
South Africa with responses from 
Burma, Colombia and East Timor, 
CllR 1999, £2.00. ISBN 1852872209 
Formal peace processes are fragile, , political deals built on compromise and often concluded under intense 
pressure. It is all too easy for human rights 
to be sidelined. Warring parties may not 
want their past deeds examined two 
closely. International negotiators may 
have a hidden economic or political 
agenda which can undermine rhetorical 
commitments to human rights. 
Yet official peace processes do provide 
a starting point from which human rights 
abuses can and should be tackled. 
A CIIR seminar in November 1988 
assessed the impact of formal peace 
processes on human rights in three coun-
tries which have supposedly made the 
transition from conflict: Guatemala, Haiti 
and South Africa. The seminar examined 
how far human rights commitments have 
been implemented, and asked what 
factors are most likely to secure real 
improvements. It went on to compare the 
experiences from Guatemala Haiti and 
South Africa with those of three countries 
still at war: East Timar, Burma and 
Colombia. 
In East Timar, civil society has taken 
advantage of new political space following 
the fall of Indonesia's former president 
Suharto to organise and develop its own 
agenda. However, as in Haiti, official 
negotiators in the peace process are not 
giving civil society a chance to 'own' the 
peace process or to set the agenda. But 
perhaps the most dangerous precedent for 
A window of opportunity <continued trom page 2> 
The international response to the violence 
in East Timar has, for once, been lucid and 
firm. Senior diplomats, including Irish 
Foreign Minister David Andrews, have 
accurately identified the source of the 
trouble. They have made it clear to the 
Indonesian authorities that the army must 
be brought under control and persuaded 
to create the neutral conditions necessary 
for the ballot. But does President Habibie 
have the capacity to do so? The signals are 
not encouraging. 
The British government has been par-
ticularly supportive of the East Timorese 
in its recent diplomatic initiatives. It is 
greatly to be regretted that the personal 
commitment to the East Timorese of the 
late deputy foreign secretary, Derek 
Fatchett, cannot be channelled into the 
massive international support crucial to 
the success of the delicate peace process. 
Mr Fatchett, who died unexpectedly in 
May, had visited East Timar at the end of 
April - the first British minister to do so 
since the Indonesian invasion 
The accords signed in New York 
provide for international support to 
ensure a free and fair vote in East Timar. 
However, the Indonesian army, which is 
party to the conflict in East Timar, is to be 
in charge of security. This is naturally a 
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cause for deep concern. The continuing 
violence of militias indicates that the 
accords are already being broken on the 
ground. A final wild card is the prospect of 
a newly elected Indonesian administration 
reneging on promises made by President 
Habibie. Two presidential candidates, 
Megawati Sukarnoputri and Abdurrahman 
Wahid, have expressed opposition to 
Habibie's policy change. 
Security conditions might become so 
bad that the vote is aborted. The United 
Nations will decide on 18 June whether 
the security situation is good enough for 
the consultation process to go ahead as 
planned. But the East Timorese have 
endured crushing violence for 23 years. 
The UN decision will not be easy, but 
should be based above all on an under-
standing of the sacrifices the East 
Timorese are prepared to make for the 
opportunity to determine their own 
future. 
A senior UN spokesman said on 26 
May that the UN Mission in East Timar 
(UNAMET) would remain until the vote on 
self-determination is completed success-
fully. 'We're here until it's done, even if it 
is postponed,' said UNAMET spokesman 
David Wimhurst. 
East Timor is the incomplete disarmament 
and demobilisation of paramilitary groups 
in Haiti, Guatemala and South Africa. 
From Truth to Transformation: The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in South Africa, CllR 1999, £2.00. 
ISBN 1852872179 
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has been the most prominent of all truth commissions 
to emerge in the past 20 years. It has had 
to perform a difficult balancing act: to 
uncover past human rights abuses while 
promoting stability in post-apartheid 
South Africa. 
This report examines the debates that 
the Commission engendered as it wrestled 
with its mandate, and asks how significant 
a role the TRC has played in the country's 
broader process of transformation. 
The report draws on the proceedings 
of a conference 'From Truth to Transform-
ation', organised by the Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(CSVR) in Johannesburg. It explores the 
strengths and pitfalls of the TRC com-
pared to truth recovery processes in other 
countries, and highlights the challenges 
likely to face South African society once 
the Commission's work is completed. 
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